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Abstract: This paper provides estimates of Indian GDP constructed from the output 
side for the pre-1871 period, and combines them with population estimates to track 
changes in living standards. Indian per capita GDP declined steadily during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries before stabilising during the nineteenth century. 
As British living standards increased from the mid-seventeenth century, India fell 
increasingly behind. Whereas in 1600, Indian per capita GDP was over 60 per cent of 
the British level, by 1871 it had fallen to less than 15 per cent. As well as placing the 
origins of the Great Divergence firmly in the early modern period, the estimates 
suggest a relatively prosperous India at the height of the Mughal Empire, with living 
standards well above bare bones subsistence. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Recently, there has been much progress in reconstructing the historical national 
accounts of a number of European countries during the early modern and even the late 
medieval periods (Blomme and van der Wee, 1994; Malanima, 2011; Krantz, 2004; 
Álvarez-Nogal and Prados de la Escosura, 2007; Broadberry, Campbell, Klein, 
Oveeton and van Leeuwen, 2011; van Zanden and van Leeuwen, 2011). This paper 
applies similar methods to Asia, providing estimates of Indian GDP for the period 
before 1871. There is a strong need for estimates of Indian GDP during the early 
colonial period, to assess the strong revisionist claims about Indian economic 
performance made recently in the context of the Great Divergence debate. 
Parthasarathi (1998) has made the most striking claims for south India during the 
eighteenth century, arguing that living standards were just as high as in Britain, while 
Bayly (1983) has painted a picture of a thriving north Indian economy during the 
eighteenth century.  
 
This paper presents estimates of GDP constructed from the output side for the 
pre-1871 period, and combines them with population data. We find that Indian per 
capita GDP declined steadily during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries before 
stabilising during the nineteenth century. As British living standards increased from 
the mid-seventeenth century, India fell increasingly behind. Whereas in 1600, Indian 
per capita GDP was over 60 per cent of the British level, by 1871 it had fallen to less 
than 15 per cent. These estimates support the claims of Broadberry and Gupta (2006), 
based on wage and price data, that the Great Divergence had already begun during the 
early modern period. They are also consistent with a relatively prosperous India at the 
height of the Mughal Empire, although much of this prosperity had disappeared by the 
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eighteenth century. Projecting back from Maddison’s (2003) widely accepted 
estimates of GDP per capita for the late nineteenth century in 1990 international 
dollars, we arrive at a per capita income in 1600 of $682, well above the bare bones 
subsistence level of $400, or a little over a dollar a day. This is more in line with the 
recent revisionist work on Europe, which suggests that Maddison (2003) has 
substantially underestimated living standards in the pre-modern world (Broadberry, 
Campbell, Klein, Overton and van Leeuwen, 2011). 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. We begin in Section II with a brief survey of 
the existing literature on India’s long run economic performance. This is followed in 
Section III by an overview of methods, drawing on previous work reconstructing 
national income in Britain and Europe before 1800. Section IV then applies those 
methods to India, describing the procedures for estimating output in agriculture, 
industry and services, before aggregating the sectoral outputs into real GDP for India 
during the period 1600-1871. In Section V, these GDP estimates are then combined 
with data on population to derive estimates of Indian GDP per capita, and used to 
compare living standards in India and Britain. A new benchmark estimate of 
comparative GDP per capita in 1600 is also constructed, and used as a cross-check on 
the time series projections from the 1871 benchmark. Section V concludes. 
 
III. INDIA’S LONG RUN ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
India’s economic performance since the late sixteenth century has been the subject of 
enduring controversy. The travelogues of Europeans to India in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries often described great wealth and opulence, but it is not difficult 
to see this as reflecting their contact with the ruling classes, who enjoyed a luxurious 
4 
 
lifestyle with consumption of high quality food, clothing and ornaments, as well as 
imported luxury products. The middle class merchants and rich peasants that 
European travellers most frequently came into contact with also enjoyed a 
comfortable life-style. However, most travel accounts of Mughal India and the 
Deccan also noted that the majority of Indians lived in poverty (Chandra, 1982; 
Fukazawa, 1982). The labouring classes were seen as living in mud huts with thatched 
roofs, eating inferior grains, wearing rudimentary clothing and the use of footwear 
was relatively unknown (Moreland, 1923: 197-203). While cultural and climatic 
conditions may explain some of the consumption differences between India and 
Europe, most writers were in little doubt that the average Indian lived in poverty.  
 
 Furthermore, there is a substantial literature which attempts to chart trends in 
Indian living standards over time, starting from 1595. The reign of Akbar is usually 
seen as the peak of economic well being, and is well documented in Abū ’l-Fazl’s 
[1595] Ā’ īn–i-Akbarī, which meticulously reported wages and prices in the region of 
Agra.  This has provided a reference point for real wage comparisons with later years. 
Desai (1972) made the striking claim that at best, the average standard of living in 
1961 was no higher than in 1595, when although a labourer could afford less 
industrial goods such as clothing, he could buy more food, with the changing relative 
prices reflecting the changing productivity trends in agriculture and industry. The 
paper provoked some controversy over the details of the calculations (Heston, 1977; 
Moosvi, 1977; Desai, 1978). Nevertheless, most writers seem to accept the idea of a 
downward real wage trend during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries before 
recovery during the twentieth century, a pattern first suggested by Mukerjee (1967).  
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This view of Mughal India as a relatively backward economy has been 
challenged recently by the work of revisionist economic historians, whose work must 
be assessed within the wider context of changing views on the Great Divergence of 
living standards between Asia and Europe. Parthasarathi’s (1998) characterisation of 
south Indian real wages as on a par with English real wages in during the eighteenth 
century is strikingly at variance with the older literature, but fits well with the claims 
of Pomeranz (2000), Frank (1998) and other world historians that the most developed 
parts of Asia were on the same development level as the most developed parts of 
Europe such as Britain and the Netherlands as late as 1800. Bayly (1983) has painted 
a picture of a thriving market economy in north India during the eighteenth century, 
which leaves a similar impression. 
 
Broadberry and Gupta (2006) compare silver and grain wages in Britain with 
those in India and China during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which casts 
doubt on the revisionist position, suggesting that the Great Divergence was already 
under way during the early modern period. However, a full assessment, encompassing 
the ruling elites and middles classes as well as the labouring classes requires the 
reconstruction of national income in European and Asian countries. This paper makes 
a start on that process by deriving estimates of GDP and population in India between 
1600 and 1870, and comparing GDP per capita between India and Britain. This is the 
first time series of national income estimates for India before the mid-nineteenth 
century, which can be seen as joining up with Heston’s (1983) estimates for the 
period after 1870. Our comparative results are also broadly consistent with Roy’s 
(2010a) point estimates of GDP per capita in Bengal and Britain around 1800. 
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III. AN OVERVIEW OF METHODS 
The first phase of historical national accounting focused on reconstructing national 
income for a small number of relatively rich countries in Western Europe and North 
America, and starting around 1870, at the beginning of the modern statistical age 
(Kuznets, 1946; Clark, 1957; Maddison, 1982). A natural development was the 
application of this approach to other parts of the globe, and many non-western 
countries now have historical national accounts reaching back to around 1870 
(Maddison, 1995). For the period before 1870, there has now been a substantial period 
of experimentation, beginning with the study of British economic growth back to 
1688 by Deane and Cole (1967).  
 
 Deane and Cole’s (1967) study was remarkable for the way in which the 
authors made efficient use of the limited range of processed data series that were 
available at the time. Subsequent research by many authors has dramatically extended 
the range of data now available, with the revised estimates of Crafts and Harley 
(1992) proving an important staging post. Broadberry, Campbell, Klein, Overton and 
van Leeuwen (2011) have now succeeded in producing annual estimates of GDP for 
Britain over the period 1270-1870.  
 
 Deane and Cole’s (1967) approach now seems remarkably simple in the light 
of the vast amount of subsequent research. Nevertheless, its simplicity and modest 
demands on data makes it particularly suitable as a starting point for Asian historical 
national accounting in the period before the wide availability of official statistics at a 
national level. We focus here on Deane and Cole’s (1967) method for the eighteenth 
century, where they constructed an index of total real output, based on industry, 
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agriculture and services. The sector that was most firmly grounded in the data was 
industry. For the export industries, such as cotton, output was assumed to grow in line 
with exports, for which abundant data were available. For home industry, production 
was assumed to move in line with the physical quantities of output of leather, beer, 
candles and soap. Finally, since Deane and Cole had no independent data on 
commerce, the index of industrial output was assumed to apply also to the commercial 
sector. It is not much of an exaggeration, therefore, to say that the whole of the 
industrial and commercial sector was dependent on the export data.  
 
For agriculture and services, by contrast, the key data series was population. 
For agriculture, an index of production was derived by assuming that agricultural 
demand grew in line with population, which amounted to assuming constant per 
capita corn consumption. An adjustment was then made for known imports and 
exports of grain, to convert demand to domestic production. For services, even in 
modern national accounts it is not uncommon to assume that real output moves in line 
with employment. Since for the eighteenth century Deane and Cole had only 
fragmentary evidence on employment, they assumed that service output grew in line 
with population. For the government sector, however, it was possible to obtain direct 
estimates of output from government budget sources. Finally, the individual series 
were combined into an index of GDP using weights for agriculture, industry and 
services derived from Gregory King’s [1696] social tables. 
 
 It should by now be clear that Deane and Cole’s (1967) estimates of British 
GDP in the eighteenth century are overwhelmingly dependent on the path of 
population and exports, with a minor role for government expenditure and a restricted 
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set of volume indicators for home industry. It would not be difficult to assemble a 
similar data set for India between 1600 and 1871, and that is what we proceed to do in 
the next section. However, we will not stop there, because work conducted since 
Deane and Cole’s (1967) study suggests a number of ways of improving upon this 
approach, and again in ways which can be replicated with the data available for India.  
 
 First, subsequent work on the agricultural sector has allowed for a more 
sophisticated treatment of demand. Crafts (1976) criticised Deane and Cole’s 
assumption of constant per capita corn consumption while real incomes were rising 
and the relative price of corn was changing, and Crafts (1985) recalculated the path of 
agricultural output in Britain with income and price elasticities derived from the 
experience of later developing countries. The approach was developed further by 
Allen (2000) using consumer theory. Allen (2000: 13-14) starts with the identity: 
rcNQ A          (1) 
where Q
A
 is real agricultural output, r is the ratio of production to consumption, c is 
consumption per head and N is population. Real agricultural consumption per head is 
assumed to be a function of its own price in real terms (P
A
/P), the price of non-
agricultural goods and services in real terms (P
NA
/P), and real income per head (y). 
Assuming a log-linear specification, we have: 
 yPPPPc NAA ln)/ln()/ln(ln 210     (2) 
where α1 and α2 are the own-price and cross-price elasticities of demand, β is the 
income elasticity of demand and α0 is a constant. Consumer theory requires that the 
own-price, cross-price and income elasticities should sum to zero, which sets tight 
constraints on the plausible values, particularly given the accumulated evidence on 
elasticities in developing countries (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980: 15-16, 60-82). 
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 For early modern Europe, Allen (2000: 14) works with an own-price elasticity 
of -0.6 and a cross-price elasticity of 0.1, which constrains the income elasticity to be 
0.5. Allen also assumes that agricultural consumption is equal to agricultural 
production. For the case of India, where more limited information is available, we 
implement a more limited version using the grain wage (the daily wage divided by the 
price of grain) and an assumed income elasticity of 0.4.
1
 
 
 Second, a number of authors have used the share of the population living in 
towns as a measure of the growth of the non-agricultural sector. This approach began 
with Wrigley (1985), and has recently been combined with the demand approach to 
agriculture to provide indirect estimates of GDP in a number of European countries 
during the early modern period (Malanima, 2011; Álvarez-Nogal and Prados de la 
Escosura, 2007; Pfister, 2008). With the path of agricultural output (qa) derived using 
equations (1) and (2), overall output (q) is derived as: 
 
qq
q
q
na
a
/1
       (3) 
where the share of non-agricultural output in total output (qna/q) is proxied by the 
urbanisation rate. The approach can be made less crude by adjusting the urbanisation 
rate to deal with rural industry or agricultural workers living in towns. 
 
IV. ESTIMATING INDIAN NATIONAL INCOME 
                                                 
1
 One way to justify this would be if the cross-price elasticity is zero and real income is the wage 
divided by the overall price level. The own-price elasticity must then equal the negative of the real 
wage elasticity. But then the overall price level used to deflate the wage cancels out with the overall 
price level used to deflate the grain price, leaving a single term in the grain wage. The slightly lower 
income elasticity of 04 is consistent with estimates for staple grains in poor societies (Bouis, 1994). 
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In this section we derive estimates of Indian GDP by sector, following the basic 
approach of Deane and Cole (1967), but incorporating demand effects into agriculture 
and urbanisation effects into services. 
 
1. Population 
The first full census of India was conducted non-synchronously between 1867 and 
1872, but is usually presented as the first decennial census for 1871. This provides the 
starting point of our population estimates in Table 1. For the period 1801-1871, we 
use the decadal estimates of Mahalanobis and Bhattacharya (1976), who assembled 
information collected by the British for the three Presidencies of Bengal, Madras and 
Bombay, and supplemented this with assumptions about the rate of population growth 
in the non-enumerated regions. For earlier years, we have drawn on the estimates 
collected together by Visaria and Visaria (1983: 466), based on a 50-year frequency. 
We use the Bhattacharya estimates for 1751-1801, the mean Datta estimates to link 
1600 and 1750, the Wilcox estimates to link 1600 with 1650, and log-linear 
interpolation for 1700.  
 
Given the hybrid nature of the series projected back from the 1871 benchmark, 
it is worth noting that Habib (1982a: 164-166) provides a useful cross-check for the 
absolute population level in 1600, on the basis of three alternative methods of 
estimation. One approach, based on the cultivated area, yields an estimate of 142 
million, while an alternative approach based on land revenue suggests a population of 
144.3 million. A third method, based on the size of armies, suggests a population of 
140 to 150 million. All three estimates are broadly consistent with our population 
figure of 142 million in 1600. 
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Indian population grew at an annual rate of 0.22 per cent over the whole 
period 1600-1871. However, growth was faster in the nineteenth century than during 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The effect of famines is easier to identify in 
the nineteenth century because of the higher frequency of observations, but crises 
were equally prevalent in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
 
2. Agricultural output 
Rather than following Deane and Cole’s (1967) assumption of constant per capita 
grain consumption, we estimate agricultural consumption using a demand function 
which allows consumers to respond to wage and price changes. Table 2 thus sets out 
an index of wages for unskilled labourers in India, together with indices of grain and 
cloth prices. The wage and grain price series are derived from Broadberry and Gupta 
(2006) for the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, supplemented by additional 
information for the nineteenth century from Mukerjee (1967), and provide the most 
widely used index of real wages in India, the grain wage. Although the precise 
magnitude of the fall in the grain wage from its high level in the early seventeenth 
century is a matter of controversy, most scholars have acknowledged the downward 
trend (Desai, 1972; 1978; Moosvi, 1973; 1977; Heston, 1977). Furthermore, it is 
interesting to note that the scale of the Indian grain wage decline is similar to that 
suggested by van Zanden (1999) and Allen (2001) for early modern southern and 
eastern Europe, where a long period of decline steadily eroded the post-Black Death 
doubling of real wages.  
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 The cloth price series are derived from the records of the East India Company 
for the period before 1833 and from Parliamentary Papers for subsequent years 
(Chaudhuri, 1978; Bowen, 2007; Twomey, 1983; Sandberg, 1974). Note that the cloth 
wage declined by less than the grain wage during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries and increased substantially during the nineteenth century as the price of 
cloth declined relative to the price of grain. As a result, the real consumption wage 
declined by much less than the grain wage, which has often been taken as an easily 
available index of living standards. Our real consumption wage is a weighted average 
of the grain wage and the cloth wage, with a weight of two-thirds given to former, 
consistent with budget studies for India during this period (Allen, 2009). 
 
 An index of agricultural production for the domestic market is provided in 
Table 3A, derived from the grain wage with the income elasticity of demand set at 
0.4. The growth of demand caused by population expansion was tempered by the 
declining grain wage, so that total agricultural consumption increased more slowly 
than population. This is consistent with a Malthusian picture of diminishing returns to 
food production.  
 
 Turning to the impact of foreign trade, however, we see that the diminishing 
returns to food production were offset in the nineteenth century by the expansion of 
non-food agricultural crops. Table 3b provides an index of agricultural exports, 
derived by obtaining the value of total exports in current prices and the share of 
agricultural crops from Chaudhuri (1983), and deflating the resulting series of 
agricultural exports in current prices by the agricultural price index from Mukerjee 
(1967). For the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, we have assumed that 
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agricultural exports grew in line with domestic agricultural production. Weights for 
the export and domestic components of agricultural production in 1871 are obtained 
by projecting the share of exports in total production in 1901 back in time. Although 
the share of exports in total agricultural production in 1871 was only around 10 per 
cent, agricultural exports nevertheless had a significant impact on the path of total 
agricultural production in the nineteenth century, as exports of crops such as raw 
cotton, opium and indigo offset the diminishing returns in food production. As we 
shall see in the next section, the export of these non-food crops also offset a 
substantial decline in exports of cotton piece goods, as India’s comparative advantage 
shifted away from manufactures. 
 
3. Industrial Output 
Table 4 sets out the data for estimating the output of industry oriented towards the 
home market. As with agriculture, we have used a demand function approach, which 
can be cross-checked against other estimates of per capita cloth consumption 
available for the nineteenth century. We have allowed cloth consumption per capita to 
move in line with the cloth wage from Table 2 and an assumed income elasticity of 
demand of 0.5. The absolute level of cloth consumption per capita in the base year of 
1871 has been set at 8.2 square yards from Roy (2011b). Roy also provides estimates 
of cloth consumption per capita for a number of other years, and our figure of 0.5 for 
the income elasticity of demand has been chosen to be consistent with these 
estimates.
2
 We find per capita consumption of cloth fell between 1600 and 1811 as 
wages failed to keep up with rising cloth prices. However, after 1811 the price of 
                                                 
2
 Roy (2011b) reports figures of 8.0 square yards for 1860, 5.7 square yards for 1840, 5.1 square yards 
for 1820 and 5.2 to 6.7 square yards for 1795. 
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cloth fell sharply while money wages continued to increase. Per capita cloth 
consumption then increased with the rising cloth wage.  
 
Nevertheless, domestic production did not move simply in line with 
consumption after 1801 because of the growing penetration of the Indian home 
market by imports from Britain, shown in Table 4B. In line with Roy (2011b), we find 
that the growing import penetration was consistent with a slight upward trend in 
domestic production for the home market, because of population growth. This 
provides quantitative support for the interpretation offered by Morris (1968) that 
colonialism did not lead to an absolute decline of the traditional Indian cotton textile 
sector. 
 
 However, before we can address fully the issue of deindustrialisation, we need 
to quantify developments in the export section of Indian industry. Table 5 and Figure 
1 provide data on Indian textile exports to Britain for the period 1665-1834 from 
Chaudhuri (1978) and Bowen (2007). Although we lack data for Indian exports to 
other countries, it is possible to make an allowance for the growing share of Britain as 
an export destination using data on regional shares of bullion inflows to India from 
Haider (1996: 323), since the purchase of Indian textiles was financed largely with 
silver. The data in Figure 1 capture the healthy state of the Indian cotton textile export 
industry during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. After 1801, however, the 
industry went into decline, particularly with the growing British competition after the 
end of the Napoleonic Wars (Broadberry and Gupta, 2009). Table 6 charts the 
continued decline of the Indian textile export industry until the establishment of a 
modern factory based industry in Bombay during the 1850s (Morris, 1983: 572-583; 
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Farnie, 2004: 400-405). The current price data for the period 1851-1871 have been 
converted to constant prices using an index of imported cotton cloth prices from 
Sandberg (1974: 260), which tracks well the price of domestically produced cloth for 
overlapping years from Mitra (1978: 207). During this period, the price of cloth rose 
by just 6.3 per cent, so the deflation makes only a small difference to the nominal 
data. 
 
Returning to the issue of deindustrialisation, we have to balance a sharp 
absolute decline in export industry against a small upward trend in domestic industry. 
Despite the relatively small weight of the export section by 1871, the scale of the 
decline was so catastrophic that the net effect was an absolute decline in Indian 
industrial production in the first three decades of the nineteenth century, rather than 
just a reduction in the share of industry in economic activity, consistent with 
Clingingsmith and Williamson’s (2008) definition of strong rather than weak 
deindustrialisation. Nevertheless, the scale of Indian deindustrialisation shown here is 
in line with that suggested by Twomey (1983) rather than the more catastrophic 
domestic industrial collapse claimed by Bagchi (1976) on the basis of evidence from 
the state of Bihar.  
 
4. The service sector 
For domestic services and housing, Deane and Cole (1967) assumed growth in line 
with population. However, recent work on the long run development of the European 
economy suggests that service sector growth moves more closely in line with the 
urban population (Broadberry, Campbell, Klein, Overton and van Leeuwen, 2011). 
Estimates of the urban share of the population in India are presented in Table 7 for 
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benchmark years, suggesting a decline in the share of the population living in cities of 
more than 5,000 inhabitants. Multiplying the population by the urban share, with 
interpolation between benchmark years, yields an estimate of the urban population, 
which remained fairly stable despite the growing total population. 
 
 For government services, Deane and Cole (1967) used current expenditure on 
government services from the budgetary accounts deflated by a price index. In the 
case of India, we can only measure the size of the government sector from the revenue 
side, but it is reasonable to assume that government expenditure moved broadly in 
line with revenue at least over the periods of time between the observations 
considered here (half centuries during the Mughal period and decades during the 
British period). Current price revenues are assembled from the sources listed in the 
notes to Table 8 and deflated using the weighted average of the grain price and cloth 
price indices presented in Table 2. Since the territory from which the revenue was 
collected varies, we have converted the revenues to a constant territorial basis by 
using real revenue per square mile as our indicator of the size of the government 
sector. Real government revenue per square mile in Table 8 fell as the Mughal Empire 
declined before increasing again under British rule during the nineteenth century, but 
surpassing the peak revenue (at the time of Akbar) only during the mid-nineteenth 
century. Note that the revenue per square mile was at its low point in the mid-
eighteenth century whether viewed from the declining Mughal or the rising British 
perspective. 
 
5. Sectoral shares 
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To aggregate the time series for output in each of the major sectors into a total real 
output index, we require value added weights. The earliest sectoral value added 
weights for India are for 1900/01 from the work of Sivasubramonian (2000). 
However, these can be projected back to circa 1871 using changes in employment 
structure, following the procedure used by Hoffmann (1965: 389) for Germany. 
Essentially, this involves assuming that the sectoral distribution of value added per 
employee in 1900/01 acts as a good indicator of the sectoral distribution of value 
added per employee in 1871.  
 
The sectoral weights for India circa 1871 are set out in Table 9. The largest 
sector was agriculture, and industry was largely geared towards the domestic market. 
Commerce accounted for 5.5 per cent of GDP, but is combined here with industry. 
Government, domestic services and housing together accounted for the remaining 
10.3 per cent of GDP. 
 
6. Total real output 
Table 10 sets out the time series for all the major sectors and the aggregate output or 
gross domestic product (GDP) index obtained using the 1871 sectoral weights from 
Table 9. Industry and commerce grew rapidly between 1650 and 1801, driven 
particularly by exports. Agriculture also expanded, but less rapidly. Since agriculture 
was the largest sector, the growth of total output was also quite modest before 1801. 
Total output stagnated between 1801 and 1841 as modest agricultural growth was 
offset by deindustrialisation. There was a return to modest total output growth 
between 1841 and 1871 as industrial growth returned and agricultural growth 
accelerated.  
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V. PER CAPITA GDP 
1. Time series projections 
The GDP series from Table 10 can be combined with the population data from Table 
1 to establish in Table 11 the path of GDP per capita in India. Per capita GDP 
declined during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries before stabilising during the 
nineteenth century. Table 12 puts India’s per capita GDP performance in an 
international comparative perspective. Benchmarking on the comparative India/GB 
per capita GDP level for 1871 from Broadberry and Gupta (2010), we see that India’s 
comparative position deteriorated from a GDP per capita of more than 60 per cent of 
the British level in 1600 to just 14.5 per cent by 1871. The relative decline occurred 
fairly steadily throughout the period. 
 
 Table 13 converts the GDP per capita information in index number form from 
Table 12 into absolute levels of 1990 international dollars, as has become standard 
since the work of Maddison (1995). This enables us to gauge how far above bare 
bones subsistence India was. The World Bank’s “dollar-a-day” definition of poverty 
suggests a per capita income level of around $400 as a minimum, and Maddison 
(1995) finds a number of third world countries at this level in the modern world. Note, 
however, that Mughal India was well above this level. Although some decline had 
occurred by the mid-eighteenth century, it was only during the early nineteenth 
century that Indian per capita incomes fell close to bare bones subsistence. 
 
 Tables 12 and 13 have important implications for the debate over the Great 
Divergence. First, Parthasarathi (1998) uses a comparative real wage study of Britain 
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and India to support the “California School” view that living standards in the most 
developed parts of Asia were on a par with the most developed parts of Europe as late 
as the end of the eighteenth century (Frank, 1998; Pomeranz, 2000). The evidence 
presented in Table 12, however, suggests that Indian living standards were already 
substantially below the British level during the seventeenth century. This supports the 
view of Broadberry and Gupta (2006) that the Great Divergence was already well 
underway during the early modern period.  
 
Second, although Table 13 provides evidence of a prosperous India at the 
height of the Mughal Empire at the time of Akbar, much of this prosperity had 
disappeared by the eighteenth century. However, with per capita incomes of more 
than 600 international dollars in 1990 prices, India was still sufficiently prosperous in 
the early eighteenth century to be consistent with the scale of market activity 
described by Bayly (1983). It is only by the beginning of the nineteenth century that 
most Indians were reduced to what Allen (2009) calls “bare bones” subsistence. 
 
2. A cross sectional benchmark check 
The results in Tables 12 and 13 are based on time series projections from a 
benchmark estimate of comparative GDP per capita levels in 1871. This potentially 
raises serious index number problems, so it is helpful to calculate an additional 
benchmark estimate for comparative GDP per capita levels in 1600 to check for 
consistency with the levels suggested by the time series projections. Although Prados 
de la Escosura (2000) and Ward and Devereux (2003) claim that these index number 
problems are serious enough to call into question the whole validity of the time series 
projection methodology, Broadberry (1998; 2003; 2006) finds broad consistency 
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between time series projections and direct benchmarks in a number of detailed case 
studies during the period since the mid-nineteenth century. This is the first study to 
extend this methodology back to the early modern period, enabling us to confirm 
Broadberry’s (2006) pragmatic conclusion that although index number problems 
exist, with careful treatment of the data it is still possible to bring time series 
projections and direct benchmarks together to tell a consistent story. 
 
 Nominal GDP data for the Mughal Empire circa 1600 have been constructed 
by Moosvi (2008), built up on a sectoral basis. The total GDP of 22,387 million dams 
has been converted to rupees and divided  by the population, obtained by applying 
Moreland’s [1923] ratio of 60 per cent of the total Indian population to Habib;s 
(1982a) figure of 142 million, used here in Table 1. Dividing nominal GDP by 
population results in a figure of Rs 6.57 for GDP per capita in Mughal India. Nominal 
GDP and population data for England are taken from Broadberry, Campbell, Klein, 
Overton and van Leeuwen (2011), yielding a GDP per capita figure of £5.66. 
Comparing the Mughal and English GDP per capita figures at the silver exchange rate  
of £1 = Rs 8 yields an Indian per capita GDP figure in 1600 that was just 14.5 per 
cent of the English level. This is broadly in line with Broadberry and Gupta’s (2006) 
result that the Indian silver wage was just 21 per cent of the English level at the end of 
the sixteenth century.  
 
However, Broadberry and Gupta (2006) also noted that at the same time, the 
Indian grain wage was 83 per cent of the English level. Comparing the price of wheat 
in India with the price of wheat in England yields a purchasing power parity (PPP) of 
£1 = Rs 1.63, a long way from the silver exchange rate. Using the wheat price PPP 
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rather than the silver exchange to compare Indian and English per capita incomes 
yields a much smaller difference, with Indian GDP per capita now 71.2 per cent of the 
English level. This is much closer to the time series projection in Table 12, where 
Indian GDP per capita was 61.5 per cent of the British level. Allowing for differences 
in territorial units (Mughal Empire versus India and England versus Great Britain) and 
smaller deviations from PPP for other prices suggests a broad consistency between the 
time series projections and the 1600 benchmark. 
 
VI. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
This paper provides estimates of Indian GDP constructed from the output side for the 
pre-1871 period, and combines them with population estimates to track the path of 
living standards. Indian per capita GDP declined steadily during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries before stabilising during the nineteenth century. As British living 
standards increased from the mid-seventeenth century, India fell increasingly behind. 
Whereas in 1600, Indian per capita GDP was over 60 per cent of the British level, by 
1871 it had fallen to less than 15 per cent. 
 
These estimates cast further doubt on the extent of the recent revisionist work 
which seeks to date the origins of the Great Divergence of living standards between 
Europe and Asia only after the Industrial Revolution (Frank, 1998; Parthasarathi, 
1998; Pomeranz, 2000). The GDP per capita data, as well as the wage and price data 
surveyed by Broadberry and Gupta (2006), suggest strongly that the Great Divergence 
had already begun during the early modern period. They are also consistent with a 
relatively prosperous India at the height of the Mughal Empire, although much of this 
prosperity had disappeared by the eighteenth century. Nevertheless, India did not sink 
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close to the bare bones subsistence level of living standards before the early 
nineteenth century. 
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TABLE 1: Indian population, 1600-1871 
 
Year Population 
level 
(millions) 
 Period Annual 
growth rate 
(%) 
1600 142  1600-1650 0.00 
1650 142  1650-1700 0.29 
1700 164  1700-1750 0.29 
1750 190  1750-1801 0.17 
1801 207  1801-1811 0.38 
1811 215  1811-1821 -0.48 
1821 205  1821-1831 0.52 
1831 216  1831-1841 -0.19 
1841 212  1841-1851 0.91 
1851 232  1851-1861 0.51 
1861 244  1861-1871 0.48 
1871 256    
   1600-1801 0.19 
   1801-1871 0.30 
   1600-1871 0.22 
 
Sources: Mahalanobis and Bhattacharya (1976: 7); Visaria and Visaria (1983: 466). 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2: Real wages of Indian unskilled labourers, 1600-1871 (1871=100) 
 
Year Wage Grain 
price 
Cloth 
price 
Grain 
wage 
Cloth 
wage 
Real 
consumption 
wage 
1600 37.7 18.3 57.1 205.9 65.9 159.7 
1650 72.3 40.9 127.6 176.8 56.7 137.2 
1700 78.3 46.6 150.6 168.1 52.0 129.8 
1750 83.5 61.4 168.3 136.0 49.6 107.5 
1801 80.3 67.6 166.7 118.9 48.2 95.5 
1811 68.1 70.4 182.6 96.7 37.3 77.1 
1821 69.9 67.9 180.4 103.0 38.7 81.8 
1831 71.1 73.1 171.8 97.3 41.4 78.8 
1841 72.3 61.3 110.3 117.9 65.5 100.7 
1851 72.9 63.3 89.0 115.1 81.9 104.1 
1861 98.8 105.6 100.0 93.6 98.8 95.3 
1871 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Source: Broadberry and Gupta (2006: 14); Mukerjee (1967: 58); Chaudhuri (1978); 
Bowen (2007); Twomey (1983); Sandberg (1974). 
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TABLE 3: Indian agricultural output, 1600-1871 (1871=100) 
 
A. Agricultural consumption  
Year Population Grain 
wage 
Consumption 
per capita 
Total 
consumption 
1600 55.5 205.9 133.5 74.0 
1650 55.5 176.8 125.6 69.7 
1700 64.1 168.1 123.1 78.9 
1750 74.2 136.0 113.1 83.9 
1801 80.9 118.9 107.2 86.6 
1811 84.0 96.7 98.7 82.9 
1821 80.1 103.0 101.2 81.0 
1831 84.4 97.3 98.9 83.4 
1841 82.8 117.9 106.8 88.5 
1851 90.6 115.1 105.8 95.9 
1861 95.3 93.6 97.4 92.8 
1871 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
B. Agricultural exports and total production 
Year Agricultual 
exports 
Agricultural 
production for 
domestic market 
Total 
agricultural 
production 
1600 11.2 74.0 67.8 
1650 10.5 69.7 63.8 
1700 11.9 78.9 72.2 
1750 12.7 83.9 76.8 
1801 13.3 86.6 79.3 
1811 14.0 82.9 76.0 
1821 19.8 81.0 74.9 
1831 23.7 83.4 77.5 
1841 32.0 88.5 82.8 
1851 51.8 95.9 91.5 
1861 56.4 92.8 89.2 
1871 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Sources and notes: Domestic agricultural production: derived from Tables 1 and 2, 
with the income elasticity of demand set at 0.4. Agricultural exports in current prices: 
Chaudhuri (1983: 828-837, 842-844), converted to constant prices using the grain 
price index from Table 2. Before 1801, agricultural exports are assumed to grow in 
line with domestic production. Share of agricultural exports in agricultural production 
in 1901 from Sivasubramonian (2000) projected back to 1871. 
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TABLE 4: Cotton textile production for the domestic Indian market 
 
A. Cloth consumption 
Year Population 
(millions) 
Cloth wage 
(1871=100) 
Cloth 
consumption 
per capita 
(1871=100) 
Cloth 
consumption 
per capita 
(sq yds) 
Cloth 
consumption 
(m yds) 
1600 142 65.9 81.2 6.7 946 
1650 142 56.7 75.3 6.2 876 
1700 164 52.0 72.1 5.9 970 
1750 190 49.6 70.5 5.8 1,098 
1801 207 48.2 69.4 5.7 1,178 
1811 215 37.3 61.1 5.0 1,076 
1821 205 38.7 62.2 5.1 1,046 
1831 216 41.4 64.3 5.3 1,139 
1841 212 65.5 81.0 6.6 1,407 
1851 232 81.9 90.5 7.4 1,722 
1861 244 98.8 99.4 8.2 1,989 
1871 256 100.0 100.0 8.2 2,099 
 
B. Imports and domestic production 
Year Cotton 
consumption 
(m yds) 
Imports 
from Britain 
(m yds) 
Domestic 
production 
(m yds) 
Domestic 
production 
(1871=100) 
1600 946 0 946 72.4 
1650 876 0 876 67.1 
1700 970 0 970 74.3 
1750 1,098 0 1,098 84.0 
1801 1,178 0 1,178 90.2 
1811 1,076 1 1,075 82.3 
1821 1,046 20 1,026 78.6 
1831 1,139 38 1,101 84.3 
1841 1,407 141 1,266 97.0 
1851 1,722 348 1,374 105.2 
1861 1,989 514 1,475 112.9 
1871 2,099 793 1,306 100.0 
 
Sources: Population: Table 1. Cotton consumption per head in 1871 from Roy (2011) 
and projected to other years with the cloth wage and an income elasticity of demand 
assumed to be 0.5. This produces estimates of per capita cloth consumption in other 
years broadly in line with the estimates surveyed in Roy (2011b). Imports from 
Britain: Sandberg (1974: 142). 
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TABLE 5: Indian textile exports to Britain, 1665-1831 
 
Year Pieces  Years Pieces 
1665 291,666  1665-69 139,677 
1700 868,095  1700-04 597,978 
1750 701,485  1750-54 632,174 
1801 1,037,440  1800-04 1,355,304 
1811 691,640  1810-14 901,745 
1821 758,397  1820-24 542,117 
1831 287,814  1830-34 192,965 
 
Sources: 1665-1761: Chaudhuri (1978: Tables C.20-C.22); 1761-1834: Bowen 
(2007). 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1: East India Company imports of textiles from India (pieces) 
 
 
 
Souces: Chaudhuri (1978: Tables C20-C.22); Bowen (2007). 
 
 
 
27 
 
TABLE 6: Total Indian textile exports, 1831-1871 
 
Year Thousand 
pieces 
Value of 
cotton goods 
(Rs 000, in 
1851 prices) 
1831 3,000  
1841 2,606  
1851 2,279 7,355 
1861  8,365 
1871  14,865 
 
Source: Piece goods exports from Twomey (1983: 42); value of cotton goods exports 
from Chaudhuri (1983: 833-834, 844), converted to 1851 prices using unit values of 
imported cotton cloth sold in the Indian market from Sandberg (1974: 260). 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 7: Urban population in India 
 
Year Population 
(millions) 
Urban  
share  
(%) 
Urban 
population 
(millions) 
1600 142 15 21.3 
1650 142 15 21.3 
1700 164 14 23.0 
1750 190 13 24.7 
1801 207 13 26.9 
1811 215 13 28.0 
1821 205 12 24.6 
1831 216 12 25.9 
1841 212 11 23.3 
1851 232 11 25.5 
1861 244 10 24.4 
1871 256 8.7 22.3 
 
Sources: Population: Table 1. Urban share: 1600, 1801: Habib (1982a: 166-171); 
1871: Visaria and Visaria (1983: 519); Other years: interpolation. 
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TABLE 8: Trends in the size of the government sector 
 
Year Government 
revenue in 
current 
prices (Rs 
million) 
GDP 
deflator 
(1871=100) 
Real 
government 
revenue (Rs 
million in 
1871 prices) 
Territory 
(1,000 
square 
miles) 
Real 
revenue per 
square mile 
(Rs in 1871 
prices) 
1600 145.9 31.1 469.1 979 479.1 
1650 228.8 69.5 329.2 1,200 274.3 
1700 333.5 80.9 412.1 1,200 343.4 
1750 181.8 96.7 188.0 1,200 156.7 
1766 16.0 96.7 16.5 98 168.4 
1801 104.9 100.3 104.5 247 423.4 
1811 166.8 107.4 155.3 353 440.4 
1821 213.5 105.0 203.3 506 401.7 
1831 220.2 105.7 208.4 514 405.4 
1841 208.5 77.5 269.2 597 450.8 
1851 276.3 71.8 384.9 771 499.3 
1861 429.0 103.8 413.5 837 494.0 
1871 514.1 100.0 514.1 904 568.7 
 
Sources and notes: Government revenue: 1600-1700: Habib (2000: 454); 1750-1871: 
Banerjea (1928: 78-82, 85-86, 373-373); India Office (various years); Revenues 
reported in pounds from the mid-eighteenth century have been converted to rupees 
using an exchange rate of £1 = Rs 8 from Chaudhuri (1978) for 1750, and a rate of £1 
= Rs 10 from Roy (2011a) for later years. The territory from which the revenue was 
raised has been derived for the Mughal period from Habib (1982b: viii) and Richards 
(1995: 1) and for the British period from Roy (2010b: 23); Colebrooke (1804: 16); 
Schwartzberg (1978: 55-56); Phillimore (1945: plate 1); Martin (1839: 273, 289, 
332); Return to the House of Commons (1857: 16); India Census Commissioner 
(1893: 17); Bartholomew (1909: 28); Waterfield (1875: 5); India Office (various 
years). GDP deflator: weighted average of grain price and cloth price from Table 2. 
 
 
 
TABLE 9: Indian sectoral weights, 1871 
 
 % 
Agriculture 67.5 
Domestic industry 21.5 
Export industry 0.7 
Total industry and commerce 22.2 
Services and housing 8.0 
Government 2.3 
Total economy 100.0 
 
Sources: Employment structure in 1875 from Heston (1983: 396); adjusted for value 
added per employee in current prices using 1900/01 data from Sivasubramonian 
(2000: 38, 405-408). 
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TABLE 10: Indian real output (1871=100) 
 
Year Agricul- 
ture 
Home 
industries 
Export 
industries 
Total 
industry 
and 
commerce 
Rent 
and 
services 
Govern 
-ment 
Total 
real 
output 
1600 67.8 72.4 148.6 80.0 95.5 84.3 71.9 
1650 63.8 67.1 148.6 75.3 95.5 48.2 67.3 
1700 72.2 74.3 202.0 87.0 103.0 60.4 75.7 
1750 76.8 84.0 213.6 97.0 110.8 27.6 80.9 
1801 79.3 90.2 457.9 127.0 120.7 74.5 87.5 
1811 76.0 82.3 304.7 104.6 125.3 77.3 82.9 
1821 74.9 78.6 183.2 89.0 110.3 70.6 79.2 
1831 77.5 84.3 65.2 82.4 116.2 71.3 81.8 
1841 82.8 97.0 56.6 92.9 104.6 79.3 87.3 
1851 91.5 105.2 49.5 99.6 114.4 87.8 95.9 
1861 89.2 112.9 56.3 107.3 109.4 86.9 95.6 
1871 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Sources: Agriculture: Table 3B, total agricultural production; Home industries: Table 
5; Export industries: Tables 5 and 6, adjusted for the growing share of British exports 
during the seventeenth century using data on bullion inflows by region from Haider 
(1996: 323); Rent and services: Tables 1 and 7; Government: Table 8; Sectoral shares: 
Table 9. 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 11: Indian per capita GDP (1871=100) 
 
Year GDP Population Per capita 
GDP 
1600 71.9 55.5 129.7 
1650 67.3 55.5 121.2 
1700 75.7 64.1 118.2 
1750 80.9 74.2 109.0 
1801 87.5 80.9 108.2 
1811 82.9 84.0 98.7 
1821 79.2 80.1 98.9 
1831 81.8 84.4 97.0 
1841 87.3 82.8 105.5 
1851 95.9 90.6 105.8 
1861 95.6 95.3 100.3 
1871 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Sources: GDP from Table 10; population from Table 1. 
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TABLE 12: Comparative India/GB GDP per capita 
 
 Indian GDP 
per capita 
GB GDP 
per capita 
India/GB 
GDP per 
capita 
India/GB 
GDP per 
capita 
  1871=100  GB=100 
1600 129.7 30.5 424.4 61.5 
1650 121.2 29.9 405.2 58.8 
1700 118.2 42.5 278.0 40.3 
1750 109.0 46.5 234.3 34.0 
1801 108.2 56.6 191.3 27.7 
1811 98.7 56.2 175.8 25.5 
1821 98.9 58.0 170.4 24.7 
1831 97.0 63.9 151.7 22.0 
1841 105.5 71.1 148.4 21.5 
1851 105.8 81.5 129.8 18.8 
1861 100.3 90.1 111.4 16.2 
1871 100.0 100.0 100.0 14.5 
 
Sources and notes: Indian GDP per capita from Table 11; GB GDP per capita 1600-
1870: from Broadberry, Campbell, Klein, Overton and van Leeuwen (2011); 1870-
1871 from Deane (1968: 106); GB population: Mitchell (1988: 9-12). Comparative 
India/GB GDP per capita level in 1871 derived from Broadberry and Gupta (2010), 
adjusting from a UK to a GB basis using Irish shares of GDP and population from 
Crafts (2005: 56) and Feinstein (1972: Table 55). 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 13: Indian and British GDP per capita, 1600-1871 (1990 international 
dollars) 
 
Year Indian GDP 
per capita 
GB GDP 
per capita 
1600 682 1,123 
1650 638 1,100 
1700 622 1,563 
1750 573 1,710 
1801 569 2,080 
1811 519 2,065 
1821 520 2,133 
1831 510 2,349 
1841 555 2,613 
1851 556 2,997 
1861 528 3,311 
1871 526 3,657 
 
Source: Derived from Table 11 and Maddison (2003). 
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TABLE 14: A benchmark estimate of India/GB GDP per capita, circa 1600 
 
Mughal Empire  
Nominal GDP (Rs m) 559.68 
Population (m) 85.2 
GDP per capita (Rs) 6.57 
  
England  
Nominal GDP (£m) 23.28 
Population (m) 4.11 
GDP per capita (£) 5.66 
  
Exchange rates  
Silver exchange rate (Rs per £) 8.00 
Wheat price PPP (Rs per £) 1.63 
  
Comparative GDP per capita  
At silver exchange rate 14.5 
At wheat price PPP 71.2 
 
Sources and notes: Mughal Empire: Nominal GDP in dams from Moosvi (2008: 2-3), 
noting that a rupee is 40 dams (Habib, 2000: 440); Population obtained by applying 
Moreland’s [1923] ratio of 60 per cent of total Indian population to Habib’s (1982a) 
figure of 142 million; England: nominal GDP and population from Broadberry, 
Campbell, Klein, Overton and van Leeuwen (2011); Silver exchange rate: Chaudhuri 
(1978: 471); PPP: Indian wheat price from Abū’l-Fazl (1595: 65. Price of Rs 0.30 per 
man of 55.32 lb is equal to Rs 0.005424 per lb (Heston, 1977: 393); English wheat 
price of 32 s per quarter of 480 lb from Mitchell (1988: 754) is equal to £0.00333 per 
lb. An Indian price of Rs 0.005424 per lb and an English price of £0.00333 per lb 
yields a wheat price PPP of £1 = Rs 1.63. 
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